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SITUATING PROJECT FINANCE AND
SECURITIZATION IN CONTEXT
A COMMENT ON BJERRE
STEPHEN WALLENSTEIN*
Carl Bjerre has written an interesting analysis of some overlap-
ping legal issues in project finance and securitization transactions.
However, some of his reasoning and conclusions do not reflect the
broader environment in which these transactions are carried out.
Project finance generally results in the creation of a new cash-
flow producing asset.  Because this asset is created not in the origina-
tor but in the special purpose vehicle (SPV), no true sale is required.
Consequently, project financings are safer from interference in the
case of an originator bankruptcy and are less sensitive to originator
recourse.  Indeed, project financings are typically non-recourse to the
originator.  Further, in a project finance transaction there is no risk of
the financing being recategorized as a secured loan on the balance
sheet of the originator, which would result in increased leverage on its
balance sheet.  Although project finance has structural aspects that
provide definite advantages over traditional structured finance, these
differences pose problems of their own.  Specifically, the opportuni-
ties for a project finance SPV bankruptcy are substantially greater
than the typically passive SPV designed for structured finance trans-
actions.  When an SPV is operating an asset, and the asset is a dan-
gerous or controversial one, there is an increased chance of adverse
financial consequences.  Project finance receivables generally (but not
always) flow from a small number of obligors.  These factors intro-
duce greater credit risk than is normally found in structured finance
securitizations, which typically consist of receivables from a statisti-
cally predictable large pool.
Professor Bjerre’s comparison and contrast of project financing
and securitization is somewhat effective, but he abruptly moves into a
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wholly unrelated discussion of consensuality with respect to the ad-
verse impact that project financed transactions may have on third par-
ties.1  Since project finance mechanisms typically result in the creation
of a new asset such as a large infrastructure project, there are fre-
quently broad social and political ramifications that are absent from
most structured financings.  Third parties are affected by the project
operations.  This leads Professor Bjerre to his main argument: that
consensuality is only present in varying degrees in project finance
transactions.2  In other words, many third parties do not consent to
the project, but are greatly impacted by it nonetheless.  Structured fi-
nance also struggles with this issue, but on the level of unsecured
creditors of the originator wanting fair compensation for the transfer
of receivables.
Professor Bjerre’s article would be more effective by comparing
and contrasting basic structuring issues in securitization and project
finance.  It is debatable whether a law review article in a symposium
issue on securitization should ruminate about erecting “a philosophi-
cal framework within which to judge the acceptability” of the trade-
offs between economic benefits and social costs involved in large
projects.3  Professor Bjerre wants to connect the “discourses” of hu-
man rights law, sociology, and developmental economics with project
finance.  This is a fine thought in the abstract, but he misses the mark.
The developmental concerns Professor Bjerre raises are important
ones.  However, I fail to see the relevance to other parts of the article.
Professor Bjerre seems to conflate issues of project financing tech-
niques with the societal effects of project finance.  Professor Bjerre
should critique not the social and political aspects of project finance,
but rather the regulatory structure governing large-scale investments
in general.  There is nothing unique to project finance in this regard.
The same power plant can be financed through project financing
techniques, through direct foreign equity investments, or by local
governments from tax revenues.  Project finance is only one of several
financial means to accomplish the same result.
The argument that project finance has negative effects on third
parties ignores the fact that the large majority of such projects are
based upon government concessions, which by their very nature are
intended to be in the public interest.  Public concessions resulting in
1. Carl S. Bjerre, Project Finance, Securitization and Consensuality, 12 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 411, 424 (2002).
2. Id. at 427–9, 434–36.
3. Id. at 435.
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negative effects on select populations are not a concern of project fi-
nance and securitization (by which I mean the financing aspects), but
of political theory and democracy.  Professor Bjerre states that such
projects are “imposed against the will of much of [the] public.”4  From
the perspective of third parties, there is nothing unique to building
power and transportation projects in emerging markets, as opposed to
shopping malls, industrial complexes or office buildings in the United
States, through conventional corporate financing.  Third parties may
consent or object to business activities occurring in society, but they
are all regulated by the government.  This is not a unique problem of
project financing, and indeed these same negative effects can occur as
a result of a securitization, which can provide specific funding meth-
ods for corporations to expand their operations, such as to construct
additional office buildings or industrial complexes.
Professor Bjerre’s use of the terms “specialness” and “agglutina-
tion” merit further exploration.5  Combining project finance and secu-
ritization approaches to the same transaction is a valuable area of dis-
cussion.6  Professor Bjerre suggests that a project finance SPV could
securitize its receivables through a bankruptcy remote true sale to
another SPV.  This suggestion, however, has substantial limitations,
which may restrict the utility of such securitizations.  Professor Bjerre
does not fully recognize the costs and effects that securitizing such an
entity would have on the overall transaction (other than saying that it
would be very costly).  The substantial additional time needed to
close a project financed SPV and then securitize its revenue stream is
a considerable cost, with comparably few benefits to the project spon-
sors.  Project financings are enormous transactions with extraordinary
legal fees designed primarily to remove risks to the ultimate parent,
although many such transactions have limited recourse to the spon-
sors through the project completion date and, to some extent, for off-
take arrangements.  There are limited incentives for that parent to
expend additional fees and resources to accomplish bankruptcy re-
moteness at its own project-SPV level, and there is little to gain from
those increased costs initially.
Securitization of a project finance transaction most likely would
occur several years after the project is completed and operating at full
capacity.  Even then, the international securitization potential would
be very limited, since the receivables to be securitized are generally
4. Id. at 434.
5. Id. at 419.
6. Id. at 411, 421–23.
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denominated in local currency, exposing the purchaser of SPV securi-
ties to devaluation risks.  In addition, while assets like toll roads may
have a large number of diversified revenue generators, many project
finance transactions have substantial off-take arrangements with a
very limited number of governmental entities without much verifiable
default history.  To the extent emerging markets modify their legal
structures to permit true sale and bankruptcy remoteness, local asset
securitizations have the potential to assist the development of na-
tional bond markets and thereby contribute to capital market devel-
opment.
Professor Bjerre’s analysis of the potential for securitizing proj-
ect financed SPVs is a useful and important contribution, and is wor-
thy of further exploration.  While such securitizations have been oc-
curring over the last several years, they are uncommon, and there
may be unexplored efficiencies in utilizing this type of transaction.
